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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of the monitoring role of 
multiple large shareholders by examining their impact on the informativeness of firms’ 
earnings. Design/methodology/approach – We use regression models that relate earnings to 
stock returns for a sample of 402 French publicly traded firms covered during 2003-2007. 
Findings – We show that earnings informativeness is significantly positively related to the 
owner’s ultimate cash flow rights. Consistent with the alignment effect, stock ownership 
aligns management and shareholders interests which reduces managers’ incentives to 
manipulate accounting information. We also find that earnings informativeness is 
significantly negatively related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
This result supports the entrenchment effect and suggests that controlling shareholders have 
greater incentives to obscure accounting figures when expropriation is likely. Finally, control 
contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates information asymmetry 
problems thereby enhancing earnings informativeness. Limitations/implications – Our 
findings stress the importance of MLS in enhancing internal monitoring and mitigating 
agency costs. Because France is characterized by a weak legal system, highly concentrated 
ownership structures and excess control, our results provide valuable insights to mitigate 
extreme agency problems. Originality/value – The paper adds to the literature on corporate 
governance and the quality of accounting information by investigating strategic interactions 
between various blockholders and their impact on earnings informativeness. The study 
complements prior studies on the monitoring role of MLS by demonstrating that both their 
presence and control size translate into significantly greater earnings informativeness. 
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1. Introduction 
Information is the lifeblood of financial markets. It is well recognized that the quality of 
corporate disclosure influences to a great extent the quality of investment decisions. Potential 
benefits of more disclosure include lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), agency 
cost reduction (Leftwich et al., 1981) and improved share price (Gelb and Zarowin 2002; Lang and 
Lundholm 2000). To the extent that management has discretion over the quality of reported 
accounting information, a large literature on corporate governance has focused on the relation 
between managerial ownership and the quality of accounting information (Warfield et al., 1995). 
Departing from Berle and Means’ (1932) seminal work on widely diffused corporate ownership, 
recent studies have focused on the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ali et al., 2007). Specifically, when minority 
shareholders face possible expropriation by large controlling shareholders, the contest to the control 
is a key issue (See, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
 The present paper contributes to prior research by further examining the impact of the 
distribution of ownership and the contest to the control on earnings informativeness in a 
concentrated ownership setting. More specifically, this study seeks to add to the understanding of 
the monitoring role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) by examining their impact on the 
informativeness of accounting earnings. Our study is carried out on a sample of 402 French publicly 
traded firms covered during the 2003-2007 period. France is characterized by a weak legal system 
and poor investors’ protections laws which may in turn give rise to minority expropriation (La Porta 
et al. 1999). Indeed, French listed firms have highly concentrated ownership structures and control 
is enhanced via devices such as double voting shares and pyramiding. The control of French firms 
is often ensured through a relatively small proportion of cash flow rights compared to that of control 
rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Boubaker and Labegorre, 2008). These characteristics increase the 
potential for extreme agency problems between the large controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. In this paper, we investigate strategic interactions between various blockholders in 
order to examine the effects of multiple large shareholders on firms’ quality of earnings 
information. 
First, focusing on agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders we 
explore whether having more than one large shareholder in the firm plays as a disciplining device 
which in turn may translate into greater informativeness of accounting earnings. Because we believe 
that control of ultimate owners is more relevant in assessing the outcome of agency conflicts we 
focus on the distribution of ultimate control rights. Warfield et al. (1995) focus on the ownership 
incentive effects and find that earnings quality is generally increasing in the level of managerial 
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ownership. Because stock ownership aligns management’s interests with those of shareholders, it 
hence reduces or eliminates managers’ incentives to manipulate accounting information. Fan and 
Wong (2002), in turn, examine a sample of East Asian firms. They suggest that concentrated 
ownership is associated with low quality earnings since controlling shareholders may report self-
interestedly and may have incentives to disclose as little proprietary information as possible. We 
contribute to the unresolved debate by empirically examining the relation between the presence of 
large controlling shareholders and firm’s earnings informativeness.  
Second, we study the interaction between main large shareholders in concentrated 
ownership context by examining the effects of voting size and voting distribution among them on 
the quality of firm earnings. We thus contribute to the discussion of firm’s agency costs stemming 
from the misalignment between control and ownership rights of ultimate shareholders (see e.g. 
Claessens et al. 2002). Fan and Wong (2002) show that due to the entrenchment effect, the 
credibility of the firm’s accounting information is reduced which in turn lowers the stock price 
informativeness of the earnings. This loss of earnings credibility is thus increasing in the degree of 
divergence between the cash flow rights and voting rights (Francis et al., 2005). We extend previous 
works by providing evidence on the governance impact of MLS on nature and the strength of the 
relationship between accounting earnings and stock return. More precisely, considering the 
ownership and control divergence (or equivalently excess control), we analyze whether the presence 
of MLS may alleviate agency problems with minority shareholders thereby improving earnings 
informativeness. 
 Finally, we investigate the impact of shared control on the informativeness of the firm’s 
earnings. Corporate governance literature agrees that the existence of large shareholders (beyond 
the largest controlling shareholder) can achieve a valuable internal monitoring function. Empirical 
studies find that the presence of multiple controlling shareholders might be value enhancing 
(Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Volpin, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Higher control 
contestability prevents opportunistic self-serving behavior thereby lessening minority expropriation 
(Gomes and Novaes, 2005), reduces the appropriation of private benefits of control (Bloch and 
Hege, 2001; Gutiérrez and Tribo, 2004), reduces rent extraction (Bennedson and Wolfenzon, 2000), 
enhances the value of firm’s excess cash holdings (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009) and 
is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for firms (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009). We extent 
this line of research by identifying a channel through which high control contestability of the largest 
controlling shareholder (or equivalently the presence of MLS) might enhance a firm’s information 
quality and thus greater earnings informativeness. 
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Overall, our results consolidate the findings of who provide compelling evidence that 
control contestability may limit the negative effects associated with the presence of a single large 
shareholder, such as earnings manipulation and extraction of private benefits. More specifically, our 
study of how the presence of multiple large shareholders affects the informativeness of firms’ 
accounting earnings generates several valuable insights. First, we find that earnings informativeness 
measured by the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns (CAR), is significantly positively 
related to the ultimate cash flow rights. This evidence is consistent with the alignment effect 
whereby stock ownership aligns large shareholder’s interests with those of minority shareholders, 
which in turn encourages transparency and reduces incentives to manipulate accounting 
information. We also find that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively related to the 
divergence between ultimate cash flow rights and control rights. This result is consistent with 
arguments advocating that excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder is conducive to 
self-serving behavior (see e.g. Ball et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Attig et al., 2006). Our result 
lends support to the entrenchment effect suggesting that controlling shareholders have greater 
incentives to obscure financial figures using, among other earnings management, untimely 
disclosure, etc., to hide their diversion activities when the expropriation likelihood is substantial 
(i.e. excess control is high). Our findings also show that the presence of multiple large shareholders 
and the contestability of control are related to significantly greater earnings informativeness. This 
result is consistent with the monitoring role of MLS and supports the findings of Bennendsen and 
Wolfenzon (2000), Gomes and Novaes (2005), Attig et al. (2008), and Guedhami and Mishra 
(2009). Indeed, we find that control contestability of the largest controlling shareholder mitigates 
information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing the informational environment of the firm.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the development of our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and sample selection procedure. Section 4 presents the 
methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical results. The penultimate section offers robustness 
checks and the last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Development of hypotheses  
2.1. Ultimate cash flow rights 
 The effect of ownership structures on firm value has been extensively discussed. In publicly 
listed corporations, the separation between ownership and control may lead to conflicts of interest 
between financiers and managers who run the company (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). These agency conflicts can be mitigated by monitoring. Investors with large 
ownership have strong incentives and enough control over the firm’s assets to monitor the owner 
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manager thereby pursuing firm’s value maximization (Berle and Means, 1932; Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994). Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) argue that 
large shareholders have incentives to engage in value-increasing activities since stock prices convey 
information to outsiders through public trading. Shareholders’ incentives to pursue value-increasing 
activities translate in turn into higher firm valuation (Claessens et al., 2002). La Porta et al. (2002) 
also support the incentive effect by showing that higher cash flow ownership by the controlling 
shareholder increases firm value as measured by the Tobin’s Q. Thus, large investors provide a 
solution to the free-rider problem (see e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980; and Maug, 1998). Gomes 
(2000) argues that reputation concerns of the controlling shareholder plays as a credible 
commitment device not to expropriate minority shareholders. As ownership stakes increase the 
large shareholders’ interests become aligned with those of small investors. In addition to high 
incentives to help overcome the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, large 
shareholders may coordinate their actions and put pressure on managers since voting power is not 
split among a highly segmented group of investors. Therefore, large ownership levels not only give 
incentive to decrease agency costs, but also the power to do so (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Kaplan 
and Minton, 1994). The presence of large controlling shareholders translates into strong incentives 
to monitor and discipline managers thereby replacing legal constraints on managerial opportunism 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Boubakri et al, 2005).  
 Drawing on the above arguments, we argue that large controlling shareholders have strong 
incentives to encourage management to report high quality earnings. Warfield et al (1995) focus on 
the incentive effects and find that earnings quality is generally increasing in the level of managerial 
ownership while the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustments decreases. Because 
stock ownership aligns management’s interests with those of shareholders, this reduces or 
eliminates managers’ incentives to manipulate accounting information. The relation between 
earnings informativeness and managerial ownership is not linear. The relation is increasing in small 
to medium levels of managerial ownership while decreasing in high levels of ownership (see e.g. 
Yeo et al., 2002). Studying a sample of Japanese firms, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) uncover evidence 
that large ownership levels are associated with lower discretionary spending. Extending their 
reasoning we expect that owning a large fraction of firm shares should increase earnings 
informativeness. The previous discussion provides an opportunity to further explore this relation 
through the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: The informativeness of accounting earnings increases with the ultimate cash 
flow rights of the controlling shareholder. 
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2.2. Divergence between ownership and control 
 The ownership structure of French listed companies is characterized by the presence of large 
controlling shareholders who possess more control than their equity ownership indicates. Control 
concentration enhanced beyond ownership stakes may depart the interests of controlling 
shareholders from those of minority investors (see e.g. La Porta et al., 2000). Extensive research 
documents that excess control built through dual-class shares, pyramidal structures or cross-holding 
among firms enables controlling shareholders to accrue private benefits thereby expropriating 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Bertrand et al., 2002; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). As such, the contest to the control of the dominant shareholders stems from the 
conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Ali et al., 2007).  
 The likelihood of minority shareholder expropriation is particularly high if large investors 
hold voting rights in excess of cash flow rights (Faccio et al., 2001). In these cases, they have an 
incentive to pay out a larger proportion of company cash flows to themselves instead of evenly 
distributing funds among all shareholders. Francis et al. (2005) find that earnings in dual class firms 
(i.e. firms characterized a separation of cash flow rights from voting rights) are less informative 
than earnings in single class firms, suggesting that the separation of control right and ownership is 
negatively related to informativeness of accounting earnings. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that East 
Asian firms with a discrepancy between voting rights and cash flow rights are perceived to provide 
controlling shareholders incentives to take self-interested actions causing the reported earnings to 
lose credibility to outside investors. In other words, there is a credibility-reducing effect of 
entrenchment which is increasing in the degree of divergence between cash flow rights and voting 
rights. Evidence on the effect of the divergence between ownership and control is provided, among 
many others, by Claessens et al. (2002). Studying East Asian economies, they find a positive and 
significant relationship between the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder and firm value 
and interpret this result as a positive incentive effect of large shareholdings. In light of the above 
arguments, we draw the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings informativeness decreases with the separation between ultimate cash flow 
rights and control rights.  
 
2.3. Multiple controlling shareholders 
 Private benefits of control imply conflicts of interests that might be alleviated by relying on 
mechanisms capable of protecting the rights of minority shareholders. A large body of literature has 
emphasized the monitoring role that may be played by outside shareholders (see e.g., Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1986; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Bloch and Hege, 2001; and Noe, 2002). Outside investors 
may lack incentives to monitor controlling owners, since they would bear all the monitoring costs 
but capture only a small portion of the monitoring gains (see Grossman and Hart, 1980). Burkart et 
al. (1997) and Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) argue, however, that outside investors have 
incentives to increase the liquidity costs without offering compensating advantages in monitoring, 
due to shareholders liquidity-control trade-off. Because the monitoring of investment decisions by 
outside investors fails to solve conflicts of interest, related themes of multiple large shareholders 
have also been visited as alternative mechanisms that may protect minority shareholders. More 
specifically, an ownership structure with multiple controlling shareholders may play as a 
commitment device that allows reaching an optimal monitoring intensity (Pagano and Röell, 1998). 
The presence of several large shareholders may then be associated with valuable monitoring, in 
particular when their share investments are evenly distributed. In other words, multiple blocks 
commit the firm to protect minority investors. Yet, a number of papers argue that multiple 
blockholders are unlikely to emerge. In Zwiebel’s (1995) general equilibrium model, investors are 
sorting such that only one of them holds a block in any given firm, precisely because they want to 
eschew the sort of competition over benefits. Winton (1993) emphasizes the free-rider problem in 
monitoring efforts among multiple large shareholders.  
 Contrariwise, some authors contend that the presence of multiple large shareholders may 
ensure the eschewal of expropriation. In a context where multiple large shareholders compete to 
gather minority votes as the latter is pivotal to seize control, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) 
show that it is optimal to have as much shareholders as possible in a controlling coalition. This 
coalition with the lowest possible cash flow stake will have the largest group of non-controlling 
shareholders from whom to expropriate which is considered as a bad outcome in terms of 
efficiency. Furthermore, the greater the cash flow possessed by this coalition, the more the coalition 
internalizes the costs of private benefits extraction and imposes limits on minority expropriation. 
Gomes and Novaes (2005) consider the trade-off that may exist between an inefficient monitoring 
of outside investors and the bargaining costs associated with the existence of multiple controlling 
shareholders. Their theoretical model allows solving this trade-off and shows that sharing control 
among large shareholders may increase efficiency in firms with investment opportunities that are 
hard to evaluate by outsiders. The presence of multiple large shareholders is seen as a device 
capable of limiting rent extraction, and securing the vote of minority shareholders when the 
different large shareholders’ shares are fairly similar (Bloch and Hege, 2001). Hence, all large 
shareholders perform a monitoring role and compete for the votes of minority shareholders by 
committing to reduce their private benefits. 
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 In line with these arguments, empirical studies were conducted to derive evidence on the 
impact of the presence of multiple large shareholders. Zwiebel (1995) considers a setting in which 
ownership structure is defined by shareholders who allocate their wealth across firms in order to 
receive a larger share of private benefits and shows that the control benefits will be divided among 
the multiple large shareholders depending on the relative size of their respective shares. Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) argue that the presence of several large shareholders should have a positive effect on 
minority investors and firm’s efficiency. Contestability of the controlling coalition’s power might 
increase firm value and limit the expropriation of minority shareholders. Moreover, the marginal 
cost of stealing increases with the number of coalition partners thereby discouraging the extraction 
of private benefits and diversion of profits. Indeed, high control contestability of the largest 
controlling shareholder might enhance a firm’s information quality and thus greater earnings 
informativeness. This result is consolidated by the findings of Attig et al. (2009) who provide 
compelling evidence that the distribution of control rights among multiple large shareholders 
alleviate agency costs of firm’s liquid assets. Their results indicate that an increase in the 
contestability of the largest controlling shareholder’s control —as a result of the higher relative 
voting power of the second and third largest shareholders or the pivotal voting power of the 
minority interests—may enhance the value of firm’s excess cash holdings, since it will be harder to 
convert liquid assets into private benefits. In line with Laeven and Levine (2008), this result 
indicates that a firm with uneven distribution of voting rights among the controlling shareholders is 
likely to have more serious agency problems that may lead to cash diversion. In turn, the existence 
of large shareholders (beyond the largest controlling shareholder) can achieve valuable internal 
monitoring (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009). Attig et al. (2008) document that when other large 
shareholders intervene in the preparation of financial information concealing or manipulating 
earnings by the largest shareholder becomes costly and more difficult. A high control contestability 
of the largest controlling shareholder is then a device to protect minority shareholders plausibly 
because it alleviates the diversion of firm’s resources for private benefits. The intuition behind this 
result is similar to that in Gutiérrez and Tribo (2004) who find that the presence of more than one 
controlling shareholder substantially decreases private benefit extraction because of the bargaining 
problem that occurs among large shareholders who are forced to share control.  
 Overall, control contestability may downgrade the negative effects of a single large 
shareholder, such as the presence of earnings manipulation, low disclosure quality and extraction of 
private benefits. Based on these arguments we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings informativeness increases when control is contestable.  
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3. Data Sources and sample selection procedure 
The initial sample is restricted to all French firms available in the Worldscope database for 
the 2003-2007 period. Following previous studies, we remove regulated utilities (SIC code 4900-
4999) and financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) due to the specificities of their informational 
environment which is more likely to be affected by legal and regulatory motives rather than by 
agency concerns. We discard all unlisted firms, those listed since less than one year and those with 
incomplete financial and/or return data. We also exclude firms for which we were unable, due to 
missing ownership data, to trace control chains back to the ultimate controlling owners. Applying 
the above-mentioned criteria, we were left with a sample of 402 firms corresponding to 2,384 firm-
year observations (See Table 1, for detailed definition of all variables used in the analysis and Table 
2 for more details on sample selection criteria and on distribution of firms on a year-by-year basis). 
Financial data and stock price related data are retrieved from the databases Worldscope and 
Datastream, respectively. Data on ownership structures were excerpted from firms’ annual reports 
which provide the list of all shareholders with more than five percent of the ownership or voting 
stake. Annual reports are available from the AMF’s website (Autorité des Marchés Financiers).  
 
4. Methodology  
 
4.1. The effect of ownership structure 
 To test the effect of multiple large shareholders on earnings informativeness, we adopt the 
following regression model: 
 
CARit = α0 + α1 (NIit) + α2 (NIit * UCFit) + α3 (NIit * Excess Controlit) + α4 (NIit * MLS Variablesit) 
+ α5 (NIit * Firm Sizeit) + α6 (NIit * Qit) + α7 (NIit * Leverageit) + α8 (NIit *Industry 
diversificationit) + (Fixed Effects) + ǫit                             
 
where, for sample firm i, CARit is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns ending at the 
fiscal year-end t (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile); NIit is the net earnings at the end of the 
fiscal year t scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year t (winsorized at 
1st and 99th percentile); UCF is the ultimate cash flow rights at the 10% threshold. It is measured 
as the sum of products of direct cash flow rights along the different ownership chain; Excess 
Control is a proxy for the separation between ultimate cash flow and control rights. It is computed 
as the difference between the ultimate control stake (UCO) and the ultimate cash flow stake (UCF), 
all divided by the ultimate control stake ((UCO–UCF)/UCO). UCO is the ultimate control rights at 
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the 10% threshold. It is the sum of weakest links along the different control chains. MLS Variables 
are various proxies for the presence and relative voting power of large controlling shareholders 
beyond the dominant owner. They are included one at once depending on the specification. Among 
the MLS Variables we include the following measures. First, MLDS is the multiple large 
shareholder dummy variable. It equals one if there are at least two large shareholders who hold each 
more than 10% of the control rights, and zero otherwise. Second, VOTE21 is the ratio of control 
rights of the second largest shareholder to control rights of the largest shareholder, VOTE2/VOTE1.  
Table 1 
Definitions and sources of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
CAR The cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns. The annual returns 
are continuously compounded from weekly stock returns starting from 52 
weeks (12 months) before the latest date that the firm discloses its annual 
report. 
Datastream 
NI The net earnings at year t divided by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
Wordscope 
UCF Ultimate Cash Flow rights (at the 10% threshold): the sum of the products of 
direct cash flow rights along the different ownership chains. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on annual reports 
Excess control 
 
Excess Control (at the 10% threshold) is the difference between the LCS’s 
ultimate control rights (UCO) and ultimate cash flow rights (UCF), all 
divided by his/her ultimate control rights (UCO) (i.e., (UCO – UCF) / 
UCO). UCO is the sum of the weakest links along the different control 
chains (at the 10% threshold) 
As above 
MLSD Multiple large shareholder dummy variable equals one if there are at least 
two large shareholders who hold each more than 10% of the control rights, 
and zero otherwise. 
As above 
VOTE21 Ratio of control rights of the second largest shareholder to control rights of 
the largest shareholder, VOTE2/ VOTE1. 
As above 
VOTE231 Ratio of voting rights of the second and third largest shareholders to voting 
rights of the largest shareholder, (VOTE2+ VOTE3)/ VOTE1. 
As above 
HERFDVOTE The natural logarithm of the Herfindhal index of the differences in the 
voting rights of two successive large shareholders, (VOTE1- 
VOTE2)2+(VOTE2- VOTE 3)2.  
As above 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (ln(MVE)) in millions of 
Euros at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Wordscope 
Q The market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
As above 
Leverage Total liability divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. As above 
Industry 
diversification 
Number of distinct business segment(s) at the two-digit SIC code level in 
which the firm operates. 
As above 
Industry dummies Industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification. As above 
 
Third, VOTE231 is the ratio of voting rights of the second and third largest shareholders to voting 
rights of the largest shareholder, (VOTE2+VOTE3)/VOTE1. Finally, HERFDVOTE is the 
Herfindhal index of the differences in the voting rights of two successive large shareholders, 
(VOTE1-VOTE2)2+(VOTE2-VOTE3)2.  
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Table 2 
Sample selection criteria of French listed firms 
Panel A: Number of firm-years by sample selection criteria 
Selection criteria Number of firm-years 
French firms available in the Wordscope database for the 2003-2007 period 4580 
                Less financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and regulated utilities  
                (SIC code 4900-4999) 513 
                Less unlisted firms and firms listed since less than one year 198 
                Less firms with missing return data 428 
                Less firms with missing financial data 306 
                Less firms with missing or incomplete ownership and voting data 751 
Total firms included in the sample 2384 
 
Panel B: Number of sample firms by year 
Year Number of firms 
2003 501 
2004 474 
2005 460 
2006 469 
2007 480 
Total  2384 
 
We introduce a set of variables as surrogates of firm characteristics to control for observed 
variations in the relation between earnings and returns that are likely due to causes other than those 
related to firm ownership structure. We rely on previous research in considering the following 
variables that may affect firms’ earnings informativeness. Firm size was found by Bamber (1987) 
and Freeman (1987) to be positively associated with the informational content of earnings 
announcements. We include it in our regressions to control for its potential effect on earnings 
informativeness. One explanation for this positive association is that large firms have more 
informative security prices due to more timely, alternative information being available as compared 
to small firms (Atiase, 1985). Thus, we include the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
in millions Euros at the beginning of the fiscal year t (Firm size) to control for the effects of firm 
size on the earnings-return relation.  
We also use, Q, the ratio of the market value of equity divided by the book value of total 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year t (winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile) to control for the 
impact of growth prospects on the earnings-return relation. This effect is ambiguous at least 
theoretically. On the one hand, high company growth opportunity translates into larger expected 
earnings growth. As investors stock price responses towards current earnings is significant, the 
stock price informativeness of firms' earnings increases. On the other hand, the market-to-book ratio 
is tied to firm risk. The risk associated with high growth firms and/or fast growing firms may 
translate into less informative earnings. Empirically, Collins and Kothari (1989) show a positive 
relation between investment opportunities and earnings transparency. Smith and Watts (1992) show 
that the issuance of diluted securities is more frequent in firms with higher growth opportunities 
hence earnings information will be impounded better on the firm’s stock prices. 
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We also include Leverage as a control for firms’ default risk. Leverage negatively impacts 
bond assessment (Dhaliwal and Reynolds, 1994) and earnings informativeness (Billings, 1999). 
Therefore, we expect that highly levered firms have less informative earnings. Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets at 
the beginning of the fiscal year t. 
Finally, we include Industry diversification as the number of distinct business segments at 
the two-digit SIC code level in which the sampled firm operates. Prior studies show that a 
company’s industry diversification has a detrimental effect on financial analysts’ ability to forecast 
earnings (Denis et al., 1997). Hence, a company’s unrelated and related industry diversification may 
have negative impact on earnings informativeness.  
 
Table 3 analyzes the identity of the controlling shareholders of French listed firms 
depending on whether the control is maintained by one or multiple controlling shareholders. The 
results show that concentrated ownership is a ubiquitous feature of these firms. Only 6% of the 
French listed firms do not exhibit a controlling shareholder at a control threshold of 10%. Following 
previous relevant literature, we categorize ultimate owners into five classes namely (1) family; (2) 
widely held firm; (3) widely held financial institution; (4) State; and (5) miscellaneous (i.e., a 
charity, a cooperative, employees, etc.). As a result, we find that family firms dominate the 
corporate landscape in France (83.31%). The State, widely held corporations and widely held 
financial institutions control only 4.51%, 3.53% and 4.77% of the French listed firms, respectively. 
Multiple large shareholders are fairly common (44.89% of controlled listed firms). They are more 
present in firms controlled by widely held financial institutions (67.29%) and by widely held firms 
(55.70%) than in family firms (43.06%) and in state-owned firms (43.56%). 
Table 3 
Sample characteristics 
 All sample firms 
(2384) 
MLS firms 
(1006)  
Non MLS firms 
(1235) 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Widely held firms 143 6.00%     
Controlled firms 2241 94.00% 1006 44.89% 1235 55.11% 
All sampled firms 2384 100.00%     
Identity of the ultimate controlling shareholder Number Percentage 
within class 
Number Percentage 
within class  
Family-controlled firms 1867 83.31% 804 43.06% 1063 56.94% 
State controlled firms 101 4.51% 44 43.56% 57 56.44% 
Widely held corporation 
Controlled firms 
79 3.53% 44 55.70% 35 44.30% 
Widely held financial institution 
controlled firms 
107 4.77% 72 67.29% 35 32.71% 
Miscellaneous 87 3.88% 42 48.28% 45 51.72% 
Total of controlled firms 2241 100.00% 1006 51.80% 1235 42.20% 
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Table 4 provides summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis. The CAR and NI 
present both large dispersion across sampled firms with a median value of - 5.41% and 5.49%, 
respectively. Summary statistics of ownership variables are in accordance with those provided by 
Faccio and Lang (2002) and Boubaker (2007). They show that the control of French firms is often 
ensured through a relatively small proportion of cash flow rights compared to that of control rights. In 
fact, ultimate controlling owners hold, on average, 41.00% of the ultimate cash flow rights and also 
control significantly more control rights than those determined by their corresponding ownership 
stakes leading to an average excess control of 21.24%. This separation between ultimate cash flow 
rights and control rights is prevalent in roughly 81.08% of the sampled firms (1933 firm-year 
observations). The voting power of the largest controlling shareholder is, on average, four times 
higher than that of the second largest shareholders (VOTE21 = 25%). The Herfindahl index measures 
the dispersion of voting rights among main large shareholders. It shows, as other MLS proxies, 
systematic differences across sampled firms and ranges from a minimum of 0 (equal voting power 
between largest shareholders) to a maximum of 98% (one dominant shareholder). Firms that have 
more than one significant shareholder (MLSD=1) represent 42.20% of the sampled firms (1006 firm-
year observations). Regarding size and leverage, firms vary from small-sized (ln(MVE) = 3.34) to 
large-sized (ln(MVE) =18.99) and from unleveraged (Leverage = 0.00%) to highly leveraged 
(Leverage = 97.91%). The median value of Q equals 0.72 suggesting that more than half of the 
sampled firms destroy value. As for the degree of industry diversification, the mean (median) of 
diversification is 2.82 (2), suggesting that on average French firms operate in three industries. Sample 
firms present different degrees of diversification, from specialized firms (singe-industry firms) to 
highly diversified firms. Note that we have winsorized variables whose values do not vary within 
reasonable ranges to avoid that our estimates will be unduly influenced by outlier observations.  
Table 4 
Summary statistics of regression variables  
 Minimum First quartile Median Mean 
Third 
quartile Maximum. Std. Dev. 
CAR (%) -103.33 -26.18 -5.41 -4.25 14.80 110.55 39.09 
NI (%) -462.30 0.72 5.49 -0.18 9.03 426.98 48.18 
LCS related variables       
UCF (%) 0.30 19.71 39.52 41.00 60.31 99.49 25.15 
Excess control (%) -29.48 2.30 18.08 21.24 32.53 96.47 20.87 
MLS related variables       
MLSD  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 1 1 0.49 
VOTE21 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.45 1.00 0.35 
VOTE231 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.37 0.64 2.00 0.46 
HERFDVOTE 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.28 0.46 0.98 0.26 
Control variables       
Firm size 3.34 10.44 11.68 12.05 13.28 18.99 2.22 
Q 0.004 0.40 0.72 1.22 1.32 20.86 2.09 
Leverage (%) 0.00 49.39 64.62 82.63 80.41 97.91 2.05 
Industry 
Diversification 1 2 2 2.82 4 8 1.50 
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4.2. Basic regression 
As a starting point, we first estimate a basic simple linear regression model that relates 
earnings to stock returns in France: 
CARit = α0 + α1 (NIit) + (Industry dummies) +ǫit                             
 where, the CARit is the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns ending at the fiscal 
year-end t. The annual returns are continuously compounded from weekly stock returns starting 
from 52 weeks (12 months) before the latest date that the firm discloses its annual report; NIit is the 
net earnings at the end of the fiscal year t scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the fiscal year t. Both variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Industry dummies are 
constructed following Campbell’s (1996) classification. ǫit the error term at year t. Similar to prior 
research, the ordinary least squares regression results show that the estimated coefficients of 
earnings are positive and statistically significant at a 1% threshold level irrespective of whether the 
equation is estimated on a year by year basis or on the pooled sample of all years from 2003 to 
2007. This implies that earnings have substantial informational content for French listed firms (See, 
Table 5). 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. The largest controlling shareholder and earnings informativeness 
Following in the footsteps of Claessens et al. (2002), we include ultimate cash flow rights 
(UCF) in all regressions to control for the incentive alignment effect of the largest shareholder and 
ultimate control rights in excess of cash flow rights (Excess Control) as to control for the extent of 
his/her entrenchment. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the coefficients on UCF (α2) and on 
Excess Control (α3) are expected to be significantly different from zero. A positive estimate on α2 
will be evidence that a higher interest stake of the largest controlling shareholder is associated with 
more informative earnings which is consistent with the incentive effect. A negative estimate on α3 
will provide evidence that the earnings of firms exhibiting larger separation between ultimate cash 
flow rights and control rights are less informative that others. The empirical results are portrayed in 
Table 6. The coefficient estimates are from the pooled ordinary least squares regressions using the 
CAR as the dependent variable where the t-statistics are based on standard errors with White (1980) 
correction for heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clustering for observations at the firm level. In 
conformity with the first hypothesis, the coefficient UCF is positive and statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. This suggests that higher cash flow stakes of the large controlling shareholder 
are associated with more convergence between his/her interests with those of minority shareholders. 
Large shareholders are more inclined to opt for higher financial reporting quality and for more 
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disclosure of material information in a timely and convenient manner which leads to greater 
informativeness of accounting earnings.  
 Consistent with our second hypothesis and in accordance with the entrenchment effect 
argument, the coefficient of Excess control is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Higher separation between cash flow rights and control rights makes the market 
expect more entrenchment of the controlling shareholder who may prefer to establish delayed or 
misleading disclosure practices that hide his/her potential expropriation activities. This market 
perception reduces reliance on accounting earnings reports which weakens earnings 
informativeness.  
 Overall, results provide strong evidence that earnings are more informative in firms where 
ultimate owners hold large cash flow rights and less informative when cash flow right are separated 
from control rights which supports our first two hypotheses. All specifications in Table 6 are 
significant at least at 0.001 level. The adjusted R2 values are about 0.07 and are comparable with 
those of relevant studies. 
Table 5 
Year-by-year regressions of stock returns on earnings 
 Intercept NI Adjusted R² F de Fisher Number of 
observations 
2003 -0.1284 0.1460 7.82% 4.86a 501 
 (-1.8486)c (5.5756)a    
2004 -0.0500 0.1678 6.94% 3.13a 474 
 (-0.6765) (4.9656)a    
2005 -0.1110 0.2121 5.02% 3.20a 460 
 (-1.5749) (4.6102)a    
2006 -0.0373 0.1199 3.18% 3.27a 469 
 (-2.2114)b (2.7064)a    
2007 -0.0363 0.2977 4.65% 3.12a 480 
 (-2.1179)b (4.9137)a    
Pooled observations -0.0605 0.1573 4.08% 3.76a 2384 
 (-2.1573)b (4.8647)a    
This table presents the results of the estimation of the following model: CARit = α0 + α1 (NIit) + (industry dummies) + ǫit. The t-
statistics, based on the White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, are between parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients. The last regression uses all observations (pooled) and controls for clustering at the firm level. The symbols a, b and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 The effects of growth opportunities on the relation between accounting earnings and market 
returns are controlled through the use of Q. The coefficient on this variable is positive indicating 
that higher growth potentials strengthen the earnings-return relation which is consistent with Jung 
and Kwon (2002). Leverage is negatively associated with earnings informativeness. High leverage 
often implies higher likelihood of default risk suggesting loosely relationship between return and 
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earnings. The coefficient on Industry diversification is negative suggesting that earnings are more 
informative in focused than in diversified firms. One possible explanation is that earnings in 
focused firms are generated through a relatively less complex process. Firm size, proxied by the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity, does not seem to affect the extent of earnings 
informativeness in France.  
 
5.2. Multiple controlling shareholders and earnings informativeness 
 The main focus of this study is to investigate the impact of multiple large shareholders on 
the informativeness of the firms’ earnings. To the extent that multiple controlling shareholders play 
an efficient-monitoring role and limit the agency costs associated with the presence of a dominant 
owner, we expect that earnings informativeness increases with the presence of more than one 
controlling shareholder (MLSD=1), when the power of the remaining large shareholders (Vote21 
and Vote231) is substantial and when the concentration of differences in voting rights of two 
successive large shareholders (Herfdvote) is low.  
Table 6 
Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness 
 Specification 1 
MLSD  
Specification 2 
VOTE21 
Specification 3 
VOTE231 
Specification 4 
HERFDVOTE 
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
NI 0.1590b (2.5307) 0.1535b (2.4198) 0.1619b (2.3453) 0.2457a (4.6503) 
NI*UCF 0.0582a (5.6641) 0.0554a (5.1643) 0.0573a (4.6744) 0.0687a (5.3637) 
NI*Excess control -0.0791a (-9.6302) -0.0764a (-8.6746) -0.0749a (-8.1587) -0.0648a (-6.1455) 
NI*MLSD 0.1149a (3.0822)       
NI*VOTE21 
  0.1989a (2.9919)     
NI*VOTE231 
 
   0.1085b (2.0072)   
NI*HERFDVOTE 
      -0.2669a (-2.7712) 
Control Variables         
NI*Firm size 0.0022 (0.6727) 0.0003 (0.1264) 0.0001 (0.0155) 0.0040 (1.2993) 
NI*Q 0.0010b (2.0348) 0.0003b (2.1248) 0.0004b (2.1483) 0.0006b (2.2136) 
NI*Leverage -0.0023a (-2.6982) -0.0009b (-2.0158) -0.0010c (1.8486) -0.0013b (-2.4436) 
NI*Industry 
diversification 
-0.0181b (-2.4821) -0.0091b (-2.0956) -0.0079b (-2.0467) -0.0152b (-2.1754) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.0490c (-1.7527) -0.0537c (-1.9333) -0.0562b (-2.0181) -0.0536c (-1.9346) 
F-Value 13.83
a
 16.75a 13.58a 15.96a 
Adjusted R-squared 7.31% 7.18% 6.87% 7.03% 
Number of 
observations 
2384 2384 2384 2384 
Table 6 estimates the parameters of the pooled time-series cross-section regression model of multiple large shareholders on earnings 
informativeness. The dependent variable is earnings informativeness proxied by the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns 
(CAR). See Table 1 for the definition if the remaining variables. The t-statistics are based standard errors with White (1980) 
correction for heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clustering for observations at the firm level. The symbols a, b and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Lower values of Herfdvote correspond to situations where controlling shareholders have 
comparable voting stakes. We expect that more contestable control (i.e., lower Herfdvote) reduces 
the likelihood of private benefits extraction, increases the commitment to a more consistent 
disclosure policy and thereby enhances the informative content of firm earnings. 
Table 6 displays regression results of multivariate regression with MLS-related proxies as 
independent variables and the CAR as the dependent variable. The coefficient on net income (NI) in 
specification 1 (Table 6) is 0.1590 and significant at p < 0.05. The coefficient on our key test 
variable (NI*MLSD) is 0.1149 with a p-value less than 0.01. This suggests that, on average, the 
earning response coefficient of firms with multiple large shareholders is 72.26% (0.1149/0.1590 = 
0.7226) higher than that for firms controlled by a unique large shareholder. This result is 
economically significant using the 10% rule of thumb for materiality. MLS seem to play an 
important governance role in limiting rent-seeking behavior. Their presence enhances the quality of 
accounting earnings and increases confidence on reported figures which in turns strengthens the 
relationship between stock prices and accounting of earnings. 
 In the second specification, we use a continuous measure of the relative power of the second 
largest controlling shareholder versus the largest shareholder (Vote21). Consistent with the 
precedent result, the coefficient on this variable (NI*VOTE21) is 0.1989 with a p-value less that 
0.01, which suggests that earnings are more informative in firms where control is contestable. If the 
relative power increases by 1%, the earnings response coefficient will be 1.2975% (0.1989%/0.1533 
= 1.2975%) higher every thing else being equal. Results remain qualitatively similar but significant 
at only 5% when we consider the relative power of the second and third largest shareholders to 
voting rights of the largest shareholder (Vote 231). 
 The results from the last specification in Table 6 confirm our previous conclusions. The 
coefficient on (NI*Herfdvote) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This shows 
that the presence of controlling shareholders with comparable distribution of voting power curbs the 
extraction of private gains, hence reducing the accounting earnings management needed to veil 
potential opportunistic behavior and leading to better earnings information. 
 Overall, the results in specifications 1 through 4 show that the presence and voting size of 
large controlling blockholders beyond the dominant owner are associated with higher-quality 
earnings. These findings lend support to the argument that multiple large shareholders play a 
valuable governance role in mitigating the agency costs that arise between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders.  
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6. Check of robustness 
 This section is dedicated to check the robustness of our results by conducting several 
sensitivity tests. Only the results of some of them are reported for sake of brevity. First, we rerun all 
regressions by interacting MLS related variables with Excess control high which is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 for all observations where the value of Excess control is greater 
than the median of the sample, and zero otherwise. By doing so, we test whether multiple 
controlling shareholders are efficient in alleviating extreme agency problems that may arise from 
the conflict of interest between the largest controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and 
hence whether their presence strengthens the relation between accounting earnings and stock prices.  
 Consistent with previous findings, the coefficient on the interaction terms between Excess 
control high on one hand and MLSD, VOTE21 and Vote231 from the other hand are positive and 
statistically significant at least at 10% threshold level whereas the coefficient on the interaction term 
with HERFDVOTE is negative and statistically significant at the 10% threshold level (See Table 7). 
Table 7 
Multiple large shareholders, excess control and earnings informativeness 
 Specification 1 
Interaction with  
MLSD =1 
Specification 2 
Interaction with 
 VOTE21 
Specification 3 
Interaction with 
VOTE231 
Specification 4 
Interaction with 
HERFDVOTE 
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
NI 0.1840a (2.8981) 0.2025a (3.2963) 0.2114a (3.4248) 0.1783a (2.6055) 
NI*UCF 0.0603a (4.5142) 0.0550a (3.9583) 0.0524a (3.4193) 0.0602a (4.0889) 
NI*Excess control -0.0799a (-10.9288) -0.7802a (-9.5363) -0.0764a (-7.9615) -0.0705a (-7.2175) 
NI*Excess control 
high *MLSD =1 
0.1840b (1.9655)       
NI*Excess control 
high *VOTE21 
  0.1383b (2.0123)     
NI**Excess control 
high*VOTE231 
 
   0.0623c (1.9012)   
NI*Excess control 
high*HERFDVOTE 
      -0.2212c (-1.7118) 
Control Variables         
NI*Firm size -0.0005 (-0.1814) -0.0006 (-0.2238) -0.0001 (-0.0352) 0.0003 (0.1123) 
NI*Q 0.0007b (1.9931) 0.0005c (1.8934) 0.0005c (1.9125) 0.0007b (1.9978) 
NI*Leverage -0.0015b (-2.1532) -0.0011c (-1.9398) -0.0010c (-1.7025) -0.0015b (-2.0670) 
NI*Industry 
diversification 
-0.0055b (-2.3125) -0.0076b (-2.2178) -0.0109b (-2.2756) -0.0080b (-2.1106) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.0556b (-1.9932) -0.0573b (-2.0612) -0.0581b (-2.0878) -0.0564b (-2.0245) 
F-Value 15.31
a
 12.48a 9.55a 41.81a 
Adjusted R-squared 6.75% 6.60% 6.50% 6.64% 
Number of 
observations 
2384 2384 2384 2384 
Table 7 tests the role of multiple controlling shareholders on earnings informativeness in firms exhibiting excess control. The 
dependent variable is earnings informativeness proxied by the cumulative net-of-market 12-month stock returns (CAR). Excess 
control high is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for all observations where the value of Excess control is greater than the 
median of the sample, and zero otherwise. See Table 1 for the definition if the remaining variables. The t-statistics are based standard 
errors with White (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clustering for observations at the firm level. The symbols 
a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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 These findings show that the negative effect of the separation between ultimate cash flow 
rights and control rights on earnings informativeness turns to be positive in the presence of multiple 
controlling shareholders or when control is contestable. Hence, the presence of multiple controlling 
shareholders does matter in the presence of a large divergence between the interests of the largest 
controlling shareholder and those of minority shareholders. Second, six percent of the sample firms 
are with atomistic ownership structure where the relevant conflict of interest is that between 
shareholders and professional managers. Empirically, we have assigned the value of zero to the 
Excess control of these widely held firms. Excluding them from the analysis do not seem to 
qualitatively change our results. Third, to be considered as a controlled entity, a firm must have a 
controlling owner who maintains at least 10% of the control rights. We re-estimate our regression 
using a tighter control threshold (20% of the control rights). The results are qualitatively similar. 
Fourth, we rerun regressions using cumulative abnormal returns calculated differently to check the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative dependent variables. The conclusions remain virtually the 
same when (1) we use cumulative raw stock returns instead of the cumulative net-of-market stock 
returns or (2) we compute the CAR over the 39 (26) weeks prior to and 13 (26) weeks after the 
current fiscal year end. Finally, results do not vary to the use of the change in earnings (∆NI) instead 
of earnings (NI) or to the inclusion of additional controlling variables such as firm age, affiliation to 
a pyramid or loss firms which is a dummy variable that take one for firms with negative net income. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Prior research provides evidence that there is a relationship between ownership structure and 
the quality of firm earnings (see e.g., Fan and Wong, 2002). Using data on ultimate owners of 
French listed firms, this paper complements prior findings with respect to the effect of ultimate cash 
flow rights and excess control on the quality of firms’ accounting information. It also extends this 
line of research to shed light on the effects of the presence of multiple controlling shareholders on 
firms’ earnings informativeness.  
The current study documents several interesting findings. First, we show that earnings 
informativeness is significantly positively related to the ultimate cash flow rights of the owner. This 
evidence is consistence with the alignment effect whereby stock ownership aligns management’s 
interests with those of shareholders, which in turn reduces managers’ incentives to manipulate 
accounting information. Second, we find that earnings informativeness is significantly negatively 
related to the excess control of the ultimate controlling shareholder. This result supports the 
entrenchment effect argument and suggests that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to 
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undertake activities that hide their egregious behaviour when the potential expropriation of minority 
investors is substantial. Finally, and more importantly, we document the monitoring role of MLS 
and show that the presence and control size of multiple large shareholders translate into 
significantly greater earnings informativeness. Control contestability of the largest controlling 
shareholder mitigates information asymmetry problems thereby enhancing firms’ earnings 
information.  
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